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Comment
The End of Low-Value Consumer
Class Action Lawsuits?: The
Federal Circuit Split on the
Ascertainability Requirement for
Class Certification*
I. INTRODUCTION

This Comment seeks to address the growing circuit split on the
ascertainability requirement of class action lawsuits. The split centers
around what Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' explicitly
states are the requirements for class certification and what some courts
have read into Rule 23. Under the high standard, creating a plan or
proposing a method with which to identify purported class members is
not enough to satisfy the ascertainability requirement. Instead, a class
must show that evidentiary means exist and are readily obtainable to
support the proposed method of identifying the case. Conversely, under
the low standard, the implicit requirement of ascertainability focuses on
the adequacy of the class definition and not whether, using the class
definition, identifying particular members of the class would be difficult.
The majority of case law examined in this Comment focuses on Rule
23(b)(3) class action lawsuits, primarily consumer class action lawsuits
involving small-value claims. Rule 23(b)(3) cases are central in the circuit
split over the ascertainability doctrine due to the challenge of identifying
class members in cases where plaintiffs likely do not have evidence to
*I want to give special thanks to Professor Jim Fleissner at the Mercer University
School of Law for his help with this Comment. I am immensely grateful for his input and
support and for the opportunity to work closely with him through the many drafts of this
Comment.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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support their status as class members, and defendants do not have
adequate records to identify potential class members.
Though a narrow issue, the split falls into the changing landscape of
federal class action lawsuits. In four recent cases with five-justice
majorities, Justice Scalia wrote for a divided Court that upheld
contractual waivers of class arbitration, questioned class-wide damages
models, and required a strict interpretation of what constitutes common
questions of law and fact sufficient to maintain a class action under Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 However, since Justice
Scalia's death in early 2016, the Court is operating at less than full
capacity for the first time since 2010.3 While turnover in the Court is
natural, a tumultuous election year in 2016 caused the position to remain
vacant for an extended period of time.4 At the end of last year's term, the
Court likely declined certiorari in Mullins v. DirectDigital, LLC5 to avoid
a split decision.
This Comment explores the issues and outcomes of recent cases
involving the meaning of the ascertainability requirement, including the
current circuit split in the area, as well as the possibility of future
litigation in the Supreme Court of the United States. Part II discusses
generally the history of class actions in the United States. Part III
explores the different approaches to the ascertainability requirement
taken by the federal circuit courts. Part IV addresses the various policy
implications of a heightened ascertainability requirement, provides
reasoning for the validity of the lower standard, and examines litigation
that may find its way to the Supreme Court.
II. HISTORY OF CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS
A. The Development of Class Action Lawsuits
Like all areas of law, class action lawsuits arose because of a need.
Sometimes, an injury, act, or conduct affects more than one person, and
2. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338
(2011); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
3. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members-text.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
4. Justice Sotomayor entered office on August 8, 2009, only seventy-four days after
her nomination. Similarly, Justice Kagan entered office on August 7, 2010, only ninety days
after her nomination. Fill Supreme Court vacancy: Our View, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 2016,
1:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/08/08/supreme-court-trump-clinto
n-garland-senate-nomination-confirmation/87976590/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
5. 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 1538 (U.S. Feb. 29,
2016).
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handling one, collective case makes more sense than handling many
individual cases. Though it is easy to see class action lawsuits as a
modern tool when industries like automobile manufactures and
6
restaurant chains can affect countless customers through one action,
class action lawsuits predate modern law, not by decades but by
centuries.7
Thirteenth century England saw cases, then known as group
8
litigation, that functioned the same as modern class action lawsuits.
Generally, these actions were brought when an individual broke village,
town, guild, or parish rules, affecting more than one person at the same
time.9 The original convenience of these group actions was the avoidance
of difficulties that arose from poor methods of transportation and
communication at the time. 10 Over time, the effects of the group litigation
became more noticeable and important."1
Overuse of group litigation in England led to several parliamentary
reforms, leading to a great decrease in its prominence and need in
England after 1850.12 Even as group litigation was being phased out by
6. See In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14-24009-CV-MORENO, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 176036 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2015); Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., No. 3:14-cb-02098JD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88323 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2016).
Lawsuits, CLASs ACTION LAWSUIT CTR.,
7. History of Class Action
http://classactionlawsuitcenter.com/history-of-class-action-lawsuits (last visited Oct. 14,
2016).
8. Id.; Susan T. Spence, Looking Back ... In a Collective Way, Bus. LAW TODAY, Vol.
11, No. 6, July-Aug. 2002, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abapublications/blt/
2002/07/looking-back-200207.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). Little about
the case is known, but records of depositions have been found, which are reported in 95
Seld. Society 8 (No. 210) (1981). Id.
9. Class Action Lawsuit Center, supranote 7.
10. Id.
11. In 1676, Brown v. Vermuden, 1 Ch. Cas. 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (1676), the court set
precedent, holding that group litigation against several defendants could bind absent
parties. Spence, supra note 8. In Brown, the church in Worselworth, like much of the
country, found itself in financially hard times after the Great Plague, the Great Fire of
London, and other lasting problems. Id. The church was able to trace some of its problems
to the town of Derbyshire, a mining town, which had repeatedly failed to pay its tithes. The
church sued the miners, asserting title to a tenth of the mine ore mined by the defendants.
After the four named representatives lost, another miner, not originally represented, came
forward and tried to demand that the adverse judgment did not bind him. The English
Chancellor felt no sympathy for the new defendant, looking at the prospective need to be
able to enforce claims that could prove infinite, as more and more parties came forward to
claim the prior holding was not enforceable against them. A defining characteristic of these
century old class action suits is the relation between the class members. While today class
members generally share some common harm but no relationship to each other, prior class
members worked, lived, or worshiped together. Id.
12. Class Action Lawsuit Center, supra note 7.
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English lawmakers, thanks to Justice Story of the Supreme Court of the
United States,' 3 the group-litigation process survived in the United
States.'4
After its initial development by the Supreme Court, Equity Rule 48,15
also known as group litigation, was codified in 1833.16 As the name
suggests, the rule developed in the equity courts.' 7 Fundamentally,
Equity Rule 48 followed two principles: all plaintiffs or defendants
materially interested in one suit, no matter how numerous, should be
made parties to the suit, but parties not present in the suit should not be
bound by the decision.' 8 This new rule allowed for representative
litigation, where "an excessive number of similar, individual cases had
been filed."' 9 Courts and legislators quickly realized Equity Rule 48's
non-binding nature on absent class members, though explicitly stated in
the text of the rule, ineffectively served the goals and needs of class action
lawsuits. 20
Early in the twentieth century, Equity Rule 38 replaced the already
defunct Equity Rule 48.21 Equity Rule 38 only lasted until 193822 when
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 were adopted as a replacement for

13. West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 722 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820).
14. Class Action Lawsuit Center, supra note 7.
15. Nikita M. Pastor, Equity and Settlement ClassActions: Can There Be Justice For
All in Ortiz v. Fibreboard,49 AM. U. L. REV. 773, 785 n.63 (2000). "Where the parties on
either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive
delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with
making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it
to represent all the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit
properly before it. But in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and
claims of all the absent parties." Id.
16. Class Action Lawsuit Center, supra note 7.
17. Spence, supra note 8.
18. Id. Justice Story articulated these two points in his opinion in West, 29 F. Cas. at
722.
19. Class Action Lawsuit Center, supra note 7.
20. Spence, supra note 8. In the 1853 case of Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (1853),
the Supreme Court ignored the last sentence of Equity Rule 48 and instead borrowed
language from the Field Code (See Stephen Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The FederalRules of Civil Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987)
(discussing the New York Field Codes and the adoption of the federal rules of civil
procedure)) as originally adopted by the New York assembly in 1849. Spence, supra note 8.
This change allowed a ruling against a class to bind absent class members. Id.
21. Class Action Lawsuit Center, supra note 7. The new rule borrowed from the same
influential Field Code language as was used in Smith. Spence, supranote 8.
22. Class Action Lawsuit Center, supra note 7.
23. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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24
the Federal Rules of Equity and the Conformity Act. Although the
advisory committee said that Rule 23 was essentially a restatement of
Equity Rule 38, Rule 23 still provided many problems for the courts and
prospective classes trying to bring suit, such as not clarifying when and
25
if absent members would be bound by a judgment.
The Supreme Court amended Rule 23 in 1966.26 The new language
explicitly provided for a class action judgment to be binding on all absent
class members. 27 Additionally, the Court laid out the requirements for
class certification and included procedures for notifying class members of
the action. 28 The Court continues to shape the law of class action lawsuits
in America as Rule 23 continues to serve as the starting point for all
29
federal class action lawsuits.

24. 28 U.S.C. § 724 (1934). See also Timothy E. Eble, Federal Class Action Practice
Manual ch. 1 § 2 (1999), http://www.classactionlitigation.com/fcapmanual/chapterl.html
(last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
[J]ustifications that led to the development of the class action include . . .: The
protection of defendants from inconsistent obligations[;] [t]he protection of the
interests of the absent class members[;] [t]he provision of a convenient and
economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits[;] [and] [a] procedure that
provides a means to facilitate spreading litigation costs among numerous
litigants with similar claims.
Id. These new rules govern civil procedure in the Federal District Courts and are
promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to the Rules Enabling
Act. Id.
25. Spence, supra note 8. See also Eble, supra note 24. ("Original Rule 23 recognized
the 'true' class action, which concluded the rights of all class members, whether named in
the suit or not; the 'hybrid' class action, in which class members made separate claims
against a common fund or property; and the 'spurious' class action, in which the members
of the class made separate claims involving common questions of law or fact. The 'true' class
action was described by original Rule 23(a) as an action in which 'the right to enforcement
for . . . the class was . . . joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of
primary right refuses to enforce it.' As opposed to judgments in 'true' class actions,
judgments in 'spurious' and 'hybrid' class actions did not determine the rights of absent
class members.'). Only two years after the adoption of Rule 23, the Supreme Court ruled in
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), that a person whose interests were inadequately
represented in a class action lawsuit was not bound by the judgment. Spence, supranote 8.
The Court reasoned that depriving someone the ability to adequately represent their
interests in court violated his or her fundamental due process rights. Id. A fundamental
principle of American law is that a person can only be bound by a judgment in litigation in
which she is designated as a party. Eble, supra note 24, at ch. 1 § 3. See Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26. Spence, supra note 8.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Class Action Lawsuit Center, supra note 7. Since the 1974 ruling in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin (providing that notice must be given to each member of the class who
can be identified, even those whose claims are so small that it is unlikely they would opt
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B. General Types of Class Action Lawsuits
The 1966 amendment of Rule 23 helped shape the current landscape
of class action lawsuits in the United States, creating several general
types of class action lawsuits.3 0 The amendment created Rule 23(b)(2)
"class action for injunctive or declaratory relief against defendants who
had acted on grounds applicable to the class,"3 1 and Rule 23(b)(3) "class

action for money damages on behalf of a grouping of persons who had a
question of law or fact in common." 32 The first paved the way for civil
rights and institutional reform class actions in the 1970s and 1980s,
while the latter helped develop the broad areas of antitrust, securities
fraud, employment discrimination, commercial, consumer protection,
environmental, products liability, and mass tort class actions.33
"Small-dollar" consumer class action lawsuits are becoming a
particularly important area of class action litigation, especially in
regards to the ascertainability requirements of the consumer class. 34
Unlike other cases, "small-dollar" consumer class action lawsuits usually
involve class members who purchased "relatively low-cost goods or
services," and likely no longer have documentary proof of purchase.35
Without a receipt or other documentary proof, both identifying class
members and class members' ability to prove membership become much
harder. 36 Although recovery for these types of claims has become more
challenging in certain federal circuits, 37 undoubtedly, this area of class
action litigation demonstrates the essential nature of class action
litigation.3 8
out to pursue individual actions). The Supreme Court has done little to substantively affect
class action litigation. Spence, supra note 8; Eble, supra note 24, at ch. 1 § 1. ("Class action
practice in federal court involves an understanding and appreciation of the United States
Constitution, (as to concepts of due process, notice and jurisdiction), Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (as to the procedural mechanism which governs class actions) and
applicable local rules of practice.").
30. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action FairnessAct of 2005, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1593 (2006).
31. Id. at 1593-94.
32. Id. at 1594.
33. Id.
34. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 654.
35. Id. at 658.
36. Id.
37. See Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015); Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,
727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012).
38. "The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo
action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an
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C. Rule 23: The Requirements for Class Certification
Rules 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enumerate
39
the requirements for class certification. Rule 23(a) begins with four
prerequisites to certification,
(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of class members is
impracticable (numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the
class representatives are typical of those of the class (typicality); and
(4) the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class (adequacy). 40
Additionally, prior to a grant of certification, a court must find that
the class meets one of the Rule 23(b) requirements: (1) prosecuting claims
individually creates a risk of inconsistent adjudications with respect to
individual class members or substantially impairs the ability of others to
protect their interests; (2) the party opposing class certification "has
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class"; or
(3) "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate" questions affecting individual members, and that
a class action is the superior method to fairly and efficiently adjudicate
4
the controversy. 1
Beyond the explicit words of the text of Rule 23, courts have added
implicit requirements for class certification, such as "(1) that a definable
class exists, (2) the named representatives are members of that class, and
42
(3) the claim of the class is live, rather than moot."

attorney's) labor." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace
v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997). In suits involving small amounts
of damages, "most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were
not available." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985). "Where it is not
economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of
small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress
unless they may employ the class-action device." Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445
U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
39. SARAH SOMERS, FED. PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS ch. 7 § 2,
2
7
http://federalpracticemanual.org/chapter /section (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
40. Id. See also Eble, supra note 24, at ch. 1 § 5.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
42. Somers, supra note 39.
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1. The 23(a) Requirements
Rule 23 does not provide a specific number guideline4 3 for determining
whether a class meets the numerosity requirement of 23(a)(1). 44 Instead,
courts look to the impracticality of joinder.4 5 Impracticality of joinder can
arise for many reasons, including but not limited to "the ease of
identifying and finding individual class members, geographical
separation, fluid composition of class population, size of individual
claims, individual ability and motivation to bring separate actions, and
the nature of the claims raised and relief sought." 46
Next, Rule 23(a) requires that the members of the class share a
common question of law or fact under Rule 23(a)(2). 47 A single question
of law or fact in common is sufficient to sustain a class's request for
certification.48 However, the common question must not be so general as
to be amorphous and unwieldy.4 9 When proving commonality, potential
classes can use statistical evidence or expert testimony.50 Failing to show
a common issue of fact or law does not necessarily require a judge to rule
against class certification. 5 ' If possible, the class can be redefined,
limited, or separated into subclasses. 52
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the named representative of the class be
able to represent the members of the class and have a valid claim against
each named defendant.53 The Supreme Court in General Telephone
Company of the Southwest v. Falcon54 articulated that a class
representative must "possess the same interest and suffer the same
43. While there is no strict benchmark, less than twenty is generally insufficient to
satisfy Rule 23(a)(1), while more than forty do satisfy the numerosity requirement. Somers,
supra note 39, at ch. 7 § 2(A)(1).
44. Id.
45. Id. See also Eble, supra note 24, at ch. 1 § 1.
46. Somers, supra note 39, at ch. 7 § 2(A)(1). Generally, the court can use common sense
to draw inferences about the class size when the exact number of the class cannot be proven.

Id.
47. Id. at ch. 7 § 2(A)(2). The Rule 23(a)(2) requirement is generally known as the
"commonality" requirement. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. See also Debra C. Weiss, Supreme CourtAllows StatisticalEvidence to Establish
Unpaid Work Time in Tyson Foods Class Action, ABA J. (Mar. 22, 2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme-courtallows_statistical-evidence-to-es
tablish unpaid -work time in (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
51. Somers, supra note 39, at ch. 7 § 2(A)(2).
52. Id.
53. Id. at ch. 7 § 2(A)(3). See also Eble, supranote 24, at ch. 1 § 1.
54. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).

2017]

ASCERTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT

1115

injury as the class members."5 5 If the lawsuit of the representative does
not represent the class or bind all of the defendants, then the
representative's role becomes moot, defeating the purpose of a
representative and the goal of efficiency in class action lawsuits.
The final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that representation of the class
must be adequate.56 Rule 23(a)(4) differs from the prior two requirements
by requiring a court to inquire into any critical disagreements that may
57
exist between the class representative and the class. An inquiry into
the adequacy of representation is important for constitutional due
process reasons.5 8 The acts of the class representative join the other
members of the class in any judgment the representative wins, and also
in any loss, under res judicata.5 9 The representation of a class is not
limited to the individual plaintiff representative but also to counsel of the
class. 60 Factors for the court to consider in analyzing counsel of the class
include "pre-filing investigation, experience, knowledge of law, and
61
resources that counsel will commit to representing the class."

2. The 23(b) Requirements
Like Rule 23(a), Rule 23(b) provides further requirements for class
certification. For a class to be certified, the class must satisfy one of the
62
Rule 23(b) requirements.
Rule 23(b)(1) attempts to prevent a situation from arising where
actions by individual class members would create inconsistent
adjudications, leading to incompatible standards of conduct by the party
opposing the class, or in some way limit the rights of other members of

55. Id. at 156.
56. Somers, supra note 39, at ch. 7 § 2(A)(4).
57. Id. Issues that may create a conflict between the class representative and the class
include a representative's failure to timely pursue a claim, or when all the members of a
class have been exposed to a toxin but have significantly different injuries. Id. See also
Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 658 (2d Cir. 1982). ("The interest of lawyer and
class may diverge, as may the interests of different members of the class.").
58. Somers, supra note 39, at ch. 7 § 2(A)(4).
59. Id.
60. Id. 'The adequacy requirement mandates an inquiry into the zeal and competence
of the representative's counsel and . . . the ability of the representative to take an active
role in and control the litigation and to protect the interests of the absentees ..... Horton
v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 677 F.2d 471, 488 (5th Cir. 1982).
61. Somers, supra note 39, at ch. 7 § 2(A)(4). "[T]he attorneys and named plaintiffs
representing the ostensible plaintiff class assume fiduciary responsibilities to protect the
interests of the absent class members." Eble, supra note 24, at ch. 1 § 6.
62. Somers, supra note 39, at ch. 7 § 2(C).
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the potential class. 63 Establishing a class eliminates the likely result of
varying standards for conduct by a defendant or inconsistent
adjudications between individual class members.
The more common class certification method is through Rule
23(b)(2).64 For Rule 23(b)(2) to be applicable, the class must show that the
defendant acted in some way that applies generally to all members of the
class. 65 Whereas Rule 23(a) allows for factual differences to exist between
the class members, as long as they share some common factual or legal
issue, factual differences can result in defeat of certification under Rule
23(b)(2).66 If a class seeks monetary damages, the class should not pursue
certification under Rule 23(b)(2).67

The last Rule 23(b) class type is 23(b)(3), where common questions of
law or fact must predominate individual questions. 6 Additionally, class
action must be the superior method for resolving the case, as decided by
the district court, using the Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) factors as guidance.69
Because Rule 23(b)(3) "allows class certification in a much wider set of
circumstances,"7 0 Congress included additional procedural safeguards for
plaintiffs attempting to certify a class under this rule, 71 such as the
predominance and superiority requirements. 72 Unlike Rule 23(b)(2), Rule
63. Id. at ch. 7 § 2(C)(1).
64. Id. at ch. 7 § 2(C)(2).
65. Id.
66. Id. Because Rule 23(b)(2) more commonly pertains to classes seeking an injunction
or declaratory relief, factual differences may cause the class to fail to meet the high factual
relatedness standard as set by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, where
Rule 23(b)(2) is only satisfied when "a single injunction or declaratory judgment would
provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when
each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory
judgment against the defendant." 564 U.S. at 360.
67. Somers, supranote 39, at ch. 7 § 2(C)(2).
68. Id. at ch. 7 § 2(C)(3).
69. The Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) factors include, "(A) the class members' interests in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class
members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action." FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D).
70. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 362.
71. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1432.
72. Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2015). Unlike Rule 23(b)(3), Rule
23(b)(2) focuses on the class as one, cohesive unit and the "indivisible nature of the
injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted ...
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 360.
This requirement does not come from the general requirement of ascertainability but from
the rule itself. Shelton, 775 F.3d at 561. Because the focus is on the remedy sought, and
because a remedy obtained by one member will similarly affect all other class members,
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23(b)(3) is primarily used when the class seeks damages, as opposed to
73
injunctive or declaratory relief.

3. The Rule 23 Implicit Requirements and Ascertainability
In addition to the explicit requirements set forth in Rule 23, courts
have adopted several implicit requirements in order for a class to reach
certification. 74 These implicit requirements include "(1) a definable class
exists, (2) the named representatives have standing, and (3) the claim of
the class is . . . not moot." 75
If a court cannot sufficiently define a class, then certification of the
class fails. 76 In defining a class, a necessary distinction exists between
objective and subjective criteria.77 Courts will not define a class using
subjective criteria, such as the members' "state of mind, criteria that
require an inquiry into the merits of individual class members' claims,
78
and criteria that depend on the outcome of the case." Even if a class is

properly defined by objective criteria, defining the class still must be both
possible and feasible.7 9 Having a properly-definable class affects many
other aspects of certification, such as allowing a judge to identify which

determining the identity of individual members is not as important. Id. See Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 362-63 ("When a class seeks an indivisible injunction benefitting
all its members at once, there is no reason to undertake a case-specific inquiry into whether
class issues predominate or whether class action is a superior method of adjudicating the
dispute."); Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143 n.18 ("Injuries remedied through (b)(2) actions are really
group, as opposed to individual injuries."). If a defendant is legally obligated to comply with
an injunction, the class representative's ability to enforce the injunction will serve the
interests of all class members, whether all members are identifiable or not. Shelton, 775
F.3d at 561. As a result, many federal circuit courts have not extended an ascertainability
requirement to Rule 23(b)(2). Id.
73. Somers, supranote 39, at ch. 7 § 2(C)(3). Of the three Rule 23(b) class options, Rule
23(b)(3) classes are usually the most expensive and time consuming. Id.
74. Id. at ch. 7 § 2(B).
75. Id.
76. Id. at ch. 7 § 2(B)(1).
77. See Rock v. NCAA, No. 1:12-cv-01019-TWP-DKL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43841
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2016) (holding class definition based on subjective criteria inadequate).
78. Joel S. Feldman, Ascertainability: An Overlooked Requirement for Class
Certification, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP., June 26, 2009, at 2, http://www.sidley.
com/-/media/files/publications/2009/06/ascertainability-an-overlooked-requirement-for-c/files/view-complete-article/fileattachment/bna -feldman newman schumaker(2).pdf (last
viewed Oct. 14, 2016). See also Somers, supra note 39, at ch. 7 § 2(B)(1).
79. Somers, supra note 39, at ch. 7 § 2(B)(1). If a judge does find the class not
sufficiently definable, the court can either deny class certification altogether, or limit or
redefine the class so that the new class satisfies all requirements for class certification. Id.
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individuals require notice of the action, who is entitled to relief, and
which individuals will be bound by any judgment by the court.8 0
The second implicit requirement for class certification is that the class
representative be part of the defined class.8 1 Once the court has made a
determination as to the objective criteria that defines a class, the class
representative must share those criteria with the other members. 82 If the
representative does not share those objective criteria with the class, then
the representative does not have proper standing to represent the class. 83
The final implicit requirement for class certification is that the claim
be live. 84 If a current class representative's claim becomes moot, the court
should dismiss the suit unless a new class representative with a live
claim can be chosen from within the class.88 Sometimes, the factual
nature of the claim may cause an individual's moot claim to be "capable
of repetition yet evading review."88 In such cases, the class representative
will be able to continue as the representative, even after the claim has
become moot. Otherwise, the claim would likely evade judicial rule in
perpetuity.87
The remainder of this Comment will explore the circuit split over
whether the implicit requirement of having a definable class based on
objective criteria is sufficient for class certification, or whether a class
definition must be accompanied by a showing that the method of
identifying class members is administratively feasible.88 A class can show
its method is administratively feasible by providing evidence of
defendant's or plaintiffs records and showing how those records will be
useful in identifying class membership.8 9

80. Id.
81. Id. at ch. 7 § 2(B)(2).
82. Id. See E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) ("A
class representative must be part of the class and 'possess the same interest and suffer the
same injury' as the class members").
83. Somers, supra note 39, at ch. 7 § 2(B)(2).
84. Id. at ch. 7 § 2(B)(3).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Richardson v. Dir. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 829 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2016)
(stating "would-be class representative can continue to seek class certification even after
losing his personal stake in the litigation if the claims raised are 'acutely susceptible to
mootness."').
88. "Administrative feasibility means that identifying class members is a manageable
process that does not require much, if any, individual inquiry." Bussey v. Macon Cty.
Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F. App'x 782, 787 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
89. Carrera,727 F.3d at 304.
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III. ASCERTAINABILITY IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
A. Introduction to this Section
This section will examine the two majority approaches to
ascertainability of class membership in class action litigation. The two
approaches are the high or strict standard for ascertainability and the
low or loose standard for ascertainability.9 0 The Third Circuit is the
leading circuit for the high standard for ascertainability, and the Seventh
Circuit, conversely, promotes the low standard of ascertainability. 91 In
addition to these circuits, other federal circuit courts have followed suit,
adopting either the high or low standard. 92 Beginning with the strict
standard, this Comment will address the two major approaches, the tests
for each standard, the courts' reasoning for choosing that approach, and
the policy concerns behind each approach.
B. High Standardof Ascertainability
1. Ordering a Remand in Marcus, the Third Circuit
Foreshadows a Shift to a Higher Standard of Ascertainability
The high standard of ascertainability, though present in many of the
federal circuit courts, began its development in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Marcus v. BMW of North America,
LLC. 93 The principal case for the high standard test focused on plaintiffs
bringing suit against BMW and Bridgestone for alleged defects and
problems with their "run-flat" tires (RFT). 94 The district court certified
the class under Rule 23(b)(3), defining class membership as "all
purchasers and lessees of certain model-year BMWs equipped with
Bridgestone RFTs sold or leased in New Jersey with tires that 'have gone
flat and been replaced."' 95 On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed the
ascertainability of the proposed class.96
90. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657-58.
91. Id.
92. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits utilize the
higher standard of ascertainability for class certification. The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits use the lower standard of ascertainability.
93. 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012).
94. Id. at 588. The plaintiff claimed that "Bridgestone RFTs are 'defective' because
they: (1) are 'highly susceptible to flats, punctures and bubbles, and ... fail at a significantly
higher rate than radial tires or other run-flat tires;' (2) cannot be repaired, only replaced,
'in the event of a small puncture;' and (3) are 'exorbitantly priced."' Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 592-94.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1120

[Vol. 68

The court began by addressing the commonly accepted aspects of
ascertainability, such as the need for the class to be defined by objective
criteria.9 7 Similarly, if the action requires individualized fact-finding, so
as to defeat the purpose of a class action, class action is inappropriate.9 8
The court referenced several policy considerations the ascertainability
doctrine promotes.99 These policies include eliminating serious
administrative burdens that devalue the benefits of class action
procedure, protecting absent class members by facilitating notice, and
protecting defendants by identifying those plaintiffs who will be bound to
the judgment under res judicata. 00
In Marcus, the court held the class was not ascertainable for several
reasons. First, BMW could not know which vehicles had originally been
fitted with the RFT wheels because the vehicles were made in Germany
by a different company, and BMW did not have a parts manifest. 101
Additionally, a car's tires may be replaced before the car leaves the lot,
meaning the car may have originally been fitted with RFTs but not
actually sold with them. 102 Finally, the class definition was not limited to
those people who took their cars to BMW dealerships to get their tires
replaced, and there was no way for BMW to know if and where those tires
were replaced.1 03
At this point in the court's reasoning, the Third Circuit had yet to
suggest anything novel or outside the bounds of the traditional
understanding of the ascertainability doctrine. 104 However, when
suggesting what the district court should consider on remand, the court
expressed hesitancy towards certifying a class that lacks a reliable and
administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative
class members fall within the class definition.10 5 The court suggested two
primary sources to determine whether identification of class members is
administratively feasible. 0 6 First, the district court can look to the
defendant's records, if they exist.107 Second, the district court can look to
the plaintiffs own records, such as receipts or invoices.108 The Third
97. Id. at 593.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id. 593-94.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Circuit quickly limited and almost reduced the plaintiffs self-producing
evidence to a nullity, as it clarified, "We caution, however, against
approving a method that would amount to no more than ascertaining by
potential class members' say so."109

Specifically in the Marcus case, but also going forward as precedent,
the Third Circuit was fearful of potential class members submitting
affidavits stating why they fit the class definition, and these affidavits
being used as evidence against the defendant. 110 The Third Circuit
focused on several policy and due process issues that inherently arise
from allowing potential class members to certify their membership to the
class through affidavit, such as the inability of the defendant to crossexamine the absent class members at trial.' While this limitation may
seem unimportant in some types of class action lawsuits, this holding
especially burdens consumer class action lawsuits are especially
burdened by this holding because there is a greater chance that neither
defendant companies nor individual purchasers will have sufficient
records to evidence a plaintiffs proper standing as a member of the
purported class.
Though this strict view of ascertainably would continue to be defined
by later cases, the general test for ascertainability in the Third Circuit
that arises from Marcus is two part: "(1) the class must be 'defined with
reference to objective criteria' . . . and (2) there must be 'a reliable and

administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative
class members fall within the class definition."'11 2 The first part of the
rule is the same as the implicit requirements that many circuits follow,
including those that adhere to the low standard of ascertainability.113
These include a class being defined by objective criteria, the class not
being vaguely defined, or the class being defined by the defendant's
liability (fail-safe class). 114 But as Marcus shows, under the strict view, a
clear class definition is not enough; members of the class must be
identifiable.

115

Arguably, the first part of the test sets forth the requirement for a class
to be properly defined, while part two sets forth the requirements for
ascertainability.1 16 For example, a class can be properly defined under

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 662.
Id.
Id. at 659-60.
Shelton, 775 F.3d at 560.
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 662.
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step one but fail under step two, due to a lack of an administratively
feasible mechanism for determining whether members fall into the class.
Both courts implementing the high and low standards of ascertainability
may agree under step one of the test but would likely disagree as how to
implement step two of the test, or whether the second step is even a
requirement at all for class certification.

2. Ascertainability in the Third Circuit after Marcus: What
Evidence Can Be Used to Determine the Ascertainability of a
Class?
While the Third Circuit was deciding the Marcus case, another case, 117
Carrerav. Bayer Corp.,'118 worked its way up to the court of appeals for
the same issue of ascertainability of a class.11 9 Like in Marcus, a
manufacturer appealed a district court's certification of a consumer
product class. 120 Here, the plaintiff class alleged that Bayer falsely
claimed and advertised it's multivitamin as a metabolism enhancer, due
to the addition of epigallocatechin gallate, a green tea extract. Neither
side disputed that there would be little in the way of documentary
evidence of purchase by a potential class member or proof of sale by the
defendant. The price for the multivitamins ranged from $8.99 for fifty
tablets to $16.99 for one-hundred tablets. Class members would
doubtfully have retained the requisite retail store receipts or product
packaging necessary to prove they in fact purchased the product.
Similarly, Bayer sold its product to retail stores, not directly to
customers.121

In its efforts to provide a method for ascertaining the class, the
plaintiff proffered two potential ways: first, by using retailer records of
online sales, and second, through affidavits of class members. 122 The
defendant challenged this second method, claiming that affidavits from
class members would be an unreliable form of evidence, pointing
specifically to the class representative's inability to remember when he
had purchased the product and to differentiate the product in this
117. After Mullins, many district courts had recently ruled on the issue of class
certification using the old standard of ascertainability. Carrerav. Bayer Corp. is an example
of these cases where a district court granted certification, and the Appellate court applied
the new standard after defendant filed for interlocutory review under Rule 23(f). 727 F.3d
at 303-04.
118. 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
119. Id. at 303-04.
120. Id. at 303.
121. Id. at 304.
122. Id.
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litigation from other generic or similar products. 123 In certifying the class,
the district court found "'speculative problems with case management'. .
insufficient to prevent class certification."1 24
However, on appeal, the Third Circuit reiterated its Marcus decision
and the higher requirements placed on class certification.1 25 Courts
should not rely on a plaintiffs assurance that it intends to meet the
requirements of Rule 23.126 Creating a plan or proposing a method with
which to identify purported class members is not enough.127 A class must
show that evidentiary means exist and are readily obtainable to support
the proposed method of identifying the case.1 28 If a class fails to do so, the
district court should deny certification, otherwise, the significant benefits
of class action are lost,1 29 and protections for both plaintiffs and
defendants are voided. 130 Before addressing the facts of Carrera, the
court restated its ascertainability rule as requiring the plaintiff to
"demonstrate his purported method for ascertaining class members is
reliable and administratively feasible, and permits a defendant to
challenge the evidence used to prove class membership."1 31 In order to
challenge the evidence used to prove class membership, the evidence
should not require individual fact-finding.132
In Carrera, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs two proposed
methods of ascertaining class members failed the court's ascertainability
test.1 33 The court concluded there was nothing inappropriate with the
first method, using retailer records as evidence for identifying class
members. 134 In fact, the court states it may be a "perfectly acceptable
method of proving class membership." 3 5 Here, the plaintiff proffered
insufficient evidence to show that retailer records could be utilized in this

123. Id.
124. Id.

125. Id. at 306-07.
126. Id. at 306.

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 307. "[The class-action device saves the resources of both the courts and the
parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated in
an economical fashion under Rule 23." Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw., 457 U.S. at 155.
130. Carrera,727 F.3d at 307.
131. Id. at 308.
132. Id. at 307.
133. Id. at 308. The plaintiff argued that class members could be identified via (1)
records from retailers and (2) affidavits from class members. Id.
134. Id. at 308-09.
135. Id. at 308.
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way. 3 6 In support of the second proposed method, the plaintiff offered
three reasons why the class was ascertainable using affidavits of class
members.1 37 First, the low value nature of the claims greatly decreases
the probability of class members submitting fraudulent affidavits. 138
Second, the court should relax the ascertainability requirement because
Bayer's total liability is capped at $14 million, as set forth by the
defendant's records.1 39 Thus, the defendant's liability will not depend on
the reliability of the class members' affidavits.1 40 Finally, because
effective screening methods exist to weed out any unreliable affidavits,
the court can be assured that false affidavits will be identified and
disregarded.141
In response to the plaintiffs first argument, the court explained that
this argument does not relate to one of the core concerns of
ascertainability, enabling a defendant to challenge class membership. 142
Whether someone is less likely to falsify a claim does not affect whether
a defendant will be able to challenge the testimony of that class
member.1 43 Accordingly, a smaller claim value does not make evidence by
affidavit any more beneficial for determining ascertainability.1 44
Second, the court concluded the plaintiffs reliance on the defendant's
fixed maximum amount of liability was misplaced.145 The doctrine of
ascertainability does protect defendants, but it also protects absent class
members.1 46 If the court cannot reasonably and efficiently identify proper
class members, undoubtedly, some purported class members will present
fraudulent claims.1 47 Because the defendant's total liability is capped at
$14 million, each additional fraudulent member dilutes all actual class
members' award share.1 48 Furthermore, if class members are unsatisfied
with the named plaintiffs representation of the class, due to his failure
to halt proceedings when he knew that class members may get less than
full relief, the judgment may not bind the class.1 49 Accordingly, the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 310.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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defendants too have an interest in ensuring payouts only to legitimate
claims. 150
Third, merely stating that screening methods exist is not enough to
satisfy the ascertainability requirement.151 The plaintiffs must do more
than assure the district court that the screening methods will be effective
because "[s]uch assurances that a party intends or plans to meet the
requirements are insufficient to satisfy Rule 23."152 Here, the plaintiffs
presented no way to determine the reliability of the model; and even if a
large number of claims are screened out, there is no way to know the real
15 3
number of fraudulent clainis.
In reaching a decision similar to Marcus, the Third Circuit, in Carrera,
explained its reasoning and further rejected the use of class member
affidavits to satisfy the ascertainability requirement. The court also
reinforced its general requirement that a plaintiff must present evidence
to support the likely success of the proposed method of ascertaining the
class. 15 4
3. How Does the Defendant's Record Keeping Affect
Plaintiffs Burden to Satisfy the Rule 23 Requirements?

the

As the higher standard for ascertainability became more refined in the
Third Circuit, plaintiffs became required to find evidence that would
support the ascertainability of a class, not merely propose a method for
ascertaining a class. Every time the Third Circuit ruled on an appeal, a
plaintiffs' ability to certify a class became more challenging. If purported
class members' claims are based on small consumer product purchases,
the plaintiff often has a better chance of relying on a defendant's records
than its own. But what happens if the defendant's records are not clear
or useful in ascertaining class members? Should the court favor or hinder
a plaintiffs certification attempts due to a defendant's lack of record
keeping?
15 5
This question was answered in Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. At
the trial court level, the district court certified a class for purchasers of

150. Id.
151. Id. at 311.
152. Id. (internal quotation marks removed) (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 306.
155. 725 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 2013).
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"as-is"156 products at Sam's Club stores. 15 7 Principally, the district court
reasoned that the plaintiffs ability to bring a class action lawsuit should
not be foreclosed due to the defendant's lack of records.15 8 The Third
Circuit rejected this reasoning as incongruous with the higher
standard.15 9 To establish a claim for a class action, the plaintiff must
satisfy all the requirements of Rule 23.160 The defendant's amount and
style of record keeping does not reduce the plaintiffs burden to fulfill the
requirements of Rule 23.161
In Hayes, the Sam's Club employees manually entered price-overrides
for purchases of "as-is" marked goods.1 62 Of the 3500 price-override
transactions during the relevant period, no reasonable way existed to
know whether the price-override was due to a purchase of an "as-is"
product or for some of many other likely reasons.163 For this reason, the
plaintiff failed to satisfy the ascertainability requirement.
4. Identifying All Class Members at the Certification Stage
Versus Showing that Class Members Can Be Identified
Even under the heightened view of ascertainability, a plaintiff need
not identify all class members at the certification stage.1 64 Instead, a
plaintiff must provide a method demonstrating that members can be
identified.165 This differentiation can quite easily become blurred because
of the requirement that a plaintiff provide evidentiary support that its
method of ascertaining the class will be successful. 66 Corporate records
may satisfy the evidentiary requirement, while also actually identifying
class members at the certification stage.' 67 While already knowing
identities of class members at the certification stage is useful, actual

156. Id. at 352. "As-is" products are not covered by product warranties. Id.
157. Id. at 353.
158. Id. at 356.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Additionally, here, the plaintiff points to no statutory or regulatory requirements requiring certain record keeping minimums or methods. Id.
162. Id. at 352. The products, when scanned at checkout, would read as the originally
listed price. The cashier would perform a "price-override," entering the discount price to be
paid by the customer. Id.
163. Id. at 355.
164. Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 164.
167. Id.
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identification of class members at that early stage is not required by the
168
ascertainability requirement under the higher standard.
5. High Standard of Ascertainability Beyond the Third Circuit
While the Third Circuit serves as the frontrunner for the high
standard of ascertainability, other federal circuits have implemented this
approach as well. Beyond the Third Circuit, the First, Second, Fourth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits also implement a higher standard of
ascertainability in their analysis of class certification.
Neighboring the Third Circuit, courts in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit have suggested similar tests and criteria
for determining whether a class should be certified under Rule 23(b)(3).
69
In Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp.,1 even after ruling that the
plaintiffs' class failed certification under Rule 23(a), the court addressed
70
the issue of ascertainability.1 Through its analysis, the court showed
that the plaintiffs class failed the ascertainability test because
"[p]laintiffs ha[d] failed to show how the potentially millions of putative
class members could be ascertained using objective criteria that are
administratively feasible." 171 Like the consumer class action cases from
the Third Circuit, the district court found the plaintiffs suggestion to
require class members to produce a receipt, offer a product label, or sign
a declaration to confirm that the individual purchased a Snapple
beverage within the class period, "unrealistic" and a method unsupported
172
by any evidence offered by the plaintiff. As unlikely as it would be for
class members to retain such documents, the court did not wish to even
tempt itself with the idea of soliciting declarations regarding the
purchasing history of class members, "invit[ing] them to speculate, or
worse."173

District courts have reached similar results in the United States Court
74
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.1 If no objective and reliable way exists
168. Id.
169. No. 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79647 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010).
170. Id. at *38-39. The purported class members were to consist of Snapple purchasers.
The case focused on labeling on Snapple products that stated the drinks were "All Natural,"
where in fact the drinks contained high fructose corn syrup. Id. at *1.
171. Id. at *40.
172. Id. at *40-41.
173. Id. at *42.
174. Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2011). The
plaintiffs in Xavier sought to certify a "state-wide class of asymptomatic Marlboro smokers
and recent quitters who are more than fifty years old and have at least a twenty-pack-year
smoking history." Id. at 1078. As relief, the class sought "medical monitoring for healthy
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to identify class members, the class quickly becomes unmanageable.1 7 5 In
Xavier, the district court denied certification of the class, rejecting
plaintiffs proffered evidence of generalized demographic data regarding
smokers. 176 Providing a district court with a general idea of what the
boundaries of a class might look like does not provide the court a method
for identifying actual class members.177 Likewise, blindly pointing to a
defendant's data or records without showing how those records will prove
useful in identifying class members does not satisfy the ascertainability
requirement. 178 Like the other courts that have adopted the strict
ascertainability test, the court shied away from allowing class members
to use affidavits, noting the challenge that would arise to the defendant
to defend its claim while lacking the ability to cross-examine class
member statements.17 9 Although the court was sympathetic to the
plaintiff class, the class "utterly fail[ed] to provide a satisfactory answer
to the problem of how membership in the proposed plaintiff class could
be reliably ascertained."1 8 0

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the
court follows a similar approach to those already mentioned that adhere
to the high standard of ascertainability.181 The court recently decided the

smokers in the form of low-dose CT scanning of the chest," with the hope of catching,
identifying, and addressing early-stage lung cancer problems where the survival odds are
drastically improved. Id.
175. Id. at 1089.
176. Id. at 1090.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1091.
181. Heaven v. Trust Co. Bank, 118 F.3d 735, 737 (11th Cir. 1997); Little v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012); Stalley v. ADS Alliance Data Sys., Inc.,
296 F.R.D. 670, 680 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (denying certification because "[tihe Court ha[d] not
been presented with reasonable methods for ascertaining the identity of the [class
members]"); see also Bussey, 562 F. App'x at 788 (finding the class as defined was not
ascertainable because plaintiffs "ha[d] not provided any indication that they have, or even
that they can obtain, data about losses at the game level"); Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chems.
Corp., 238 F.R.D. 273, 302 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (rejecting "plaintiffs' optimistic argument that
prospective class members could be counted on to self-select"); LaBauve v. Olin Corp., 231
F.R.D. 632, 684 (S.D. Ala. 2005) (holding possibility of publication notice does not establish
ascertainability in part because "certain people may respond to publication notice even
though they were not [part of the class]"); Perez v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 262,
269 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding ascertainability not established when "the only evidence likely
to be offered in many instances will be the putative class members uncorroborated claim
that he or she used the product").
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83
82
case of Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 in mid-2015.1 The
district court denied class certification due to the class's failure to satisfy
the ascertainability requirement and the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2)
or (3).184 In order to satisfy the ascertainability requirement, the plaintiff
proposed using the defendant's sales data; however, the defendant
primarily sold to distributors and retailers, not directly to customers.185
Additionally, on its own accord, the district court rejected an affidavitbased method for proving ascertainability, concluding such a method
would deprive the defendant of its due process rights to "challenge the

claims of each putative . . . member," create a series of mini-trials to

determine class membership, and invite fraudulent submissions from
non-class members.186

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
and reasoning.187 Throughout its analysis, the court cited cases from the
188 Importantly, in its
Third Circuit, including Carrera and Marcus.
reasoning, the court explained that the plaintiffs proposal to identify
89
class members through defendant's records was "incomplete."1 The
analysis begins with identifying potential sources of evidence to support
a method for identifying class members, but it does not stop there. 190 In
Karhu, the plaintiff failed to "explain how the data would aid classmember identification."1 91 Accordingly, a plaintiff must offer a method
92
for class identification supported by sufficient evidentiary sources.1

182. 621 F. App'x 945 (11th Cir. 2015).
183. Id. Here, the class involved a dietary supplement called VPX Meltdown Fat
Incinerator, which it advertises as a fat loss supplement. The plaintiff purchased the
supplement in reliance on Meltdown's advertising and alleged that the advertising was
false because Meltdown does not aid fat loss. Id. at 946.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 947.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 948.
189. Id. at 949.
190. Id.
191. Id. The Eleventh Circuit points out that no "obvious," potential methods of
identification existed, suggesting that the district court could have raised and offered an
identification method sua sponte. Id.
192. Id. For an example of a plaintiff class satisfying the higher standard of
ascertainability, see Family Med. Pharm., LLC v. Perfumania Holdings, No. 15-0563-WSC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173255 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 14, 2016) (finding plaintiff class proposed
a manageable, logistically straightforward means of identifying class members).
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C. The Low Standard of Ascertainability
Under the low standard of ascertainability, courts only recognize the
first step in the high standard's ascertainably, requiring an adequate
class definition. The low standard does not ask, if "given an adequate
class definition, it would be difficult to identify particular members of the
class." 93 In essence, the low standard of ascertainability requires courts
to look no further than the textual requirements of Rule 23. Therefore, a
class definition that is objective and definite will allow a court to
ascertain whether an individual is a class member.
In July 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC,194 affirmed the district court's
grant of the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. The case fell under the
umbrella category of consumer class action lawsuits. The appellant,
Direct Digital, LLC, (Direct Digital) produced and sold "Instaflex Joint
Support," a product that Direct Digital represented to "relievef[ joint
discomfort." While the advertising and product labeling material
contained statements such as "relieve discomfort," "improve flexibility,"
"increase mobility," "scientifically formulated," and "clinically tested for
maximum effectiveness," in reality, the primary ingredient in the
supplement, glucosamine sulfate, is nothing more than a sugar pill, with
no scientific support for the alleged benefits of the product.19 5 After the
plaintiff alleged that Direct Digital violated several consumer fraud
statutes under Illinois law, the district court granted certification of the
class under Rule 23(b)(3).196 Being allowed to file a petition for immediate
appeal under Rule 23(f), Direct Digital challenged the class certification,
arguing that "the district court abused its discretion in certifying the
class without first [addressing] . . . [the issue of whether] the class was
ascertainable."1 97 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the
defendant's
appeal
to
adopt the heightened
standard
of
98
ascertainability.1
193. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 659. See also Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481,
495 (7th Cir. 2012) ("It's not hard to see how this class lacks the definiteness required for
class certification; there is no way to know or readily ascertain who is a member of the
class."); Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating class definition
"must be definite enough that the class can be ascertained"); accord. Adashunas v. Negley,
626 F.2d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1980) ("In summary, the proposed class of plaintiffs is so highly
diverse and so difficult to identify that it is not adequately defined or nearly
ascertainable.").
194. 795 F.3d 654.
195. Id. at 658.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 659.
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The adoption of the low standard of ascertainability by the Seventh
Circuit in Mullins does not mean that there are no implicit requirements
of Rule 23 in class certification analysis. 9 9 The approach is not all or
nothing. 200 Instead, the court can recognize that there are implicit
requirements, while not holding to the strict standard of
ascertainability. 201 However, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the
imposition at the certification stage that the plaintiff be required to prove
there is a reliable and administratively feasible way to identify all
members who fall within the class definition is not an inappropriate
extension of the Rule 23 requirements. 20 2 The Seventh Circuit
determined the existing requirements properly balance the concerns of
Rule 23.203
1. Test for Ascertainability Under the Low Standard
For a class to achieve certification under the low standard of
ascertainability, the court's initial analysis is similar to other circuits;
Rule 23 requires that the class be defined. 204 In creating a class
definition, the class must clearly define the class using objective
criteria. 205 However, unlike the high standard of ascertainability, the
implicit requirements under the low standard of ascertainability focus on
the adequacy of the class definition and not whether, using the class
definition, identifying particular members of the class would be
difficult. 206 With these thoughts in mind, the court in Mullins v. Direct
Digital, LLC helped identify common class certification problems when
207
applying the low standard of ascertainability.

199. Id. at 657.
200. Id. Both the Seventh Circuit and circuits adopting the high standard of
ascertainability agree on the following implicit requirements of Rule 23, that "a class must
be defined clearly and that membership be defined by objective criteria." Id.
201. Id. The implicit requirements of Rule 23 apply to all three types of certification. Id.;
see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).(3).
202. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657.
203. Id. at 658.
204. Id. at 659.
205. Id.
206. Id. The Eight Circuit's analysis in Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medtox
Science, Inc. is an example of the lower standard's application of ascertainability of class
members. 821 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2016). Instead of making a separate ascertainability
requirement, like those circuits that have adopted the higher standard of ascertainability,
the Eighth Circuit "adheres to a rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 requirements, which
includes that a class 'must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable."' Id. at 996.
207. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 659-60.
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First, a vaguely defined class fails to satisfy the "clear definition"
requirement. 208 When a definition is imprecise, the court loses its ability
to identify who needs to receive notice of case actions, who can recover
under any judgment, and when an individual will be bound by a
judgment under res judicata. 209 To avoid vagueness, the class definition
should answer specific questions, such as what particular group was
injured, when did the particular in jury occur, where did the injury occur,
and in what particular way did the injury occur. 210
Second, a class will fail if it is defined by subjective, rather than
objective, criteria. 211 To avoid defining a class in a subjective way, the
class should be defined in terms of conduct rather than a subjective
element, such as state of mind. 212
Third, a class should not be denied in terms of success on the merits. 2 13
When a class is defined in this way, various problems arise for the
defendant. If the class is successful, winning on the merits of the case,
then the defendant will be liable to the successful class. If the class is
unsuccessful, then members of the class can redefine under different
criteria because "a class member either wins or, by virtue of losing, is
defined out of the class and is therefore not bound by the judgment."21 4 If
this were allowed, a defendant could be exposed to multiple rounds of
litigation, all from the same plaintiffs. 215 To avoid this problem, classes
should not be defined in terms of the defendant's liability. 216
In Mullins, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the purported class met all
of these requirements. 217 In terms of vagueness, the class identified a
particular group of individuals (purchasers of Instaflex), harmed a
certain way (defrauded by labeling and marketing materials), in a certain
period of time and place. 218 For the objectivity requirement, the class was
not based on subjective criteria. 219 The class focused on those who
purchased the product and the defendant's conduct of labeling and

208. Id. at 659.
209. Id. at 660.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. (quoting Messner v. Northshore Univ. Healthsystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th
Cir. 2012)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 660-61.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 661.
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advertising its product. 220 Finally, the definition did not create a fail-safe
class. 221 If the plaintiffs did not prevail on the merits, res judicata would
bar the class members from filing new litigation against the defendant. 222
2. Lower Standard's Approach to Use
Defendant Records

and Adequacy

of

Another difference between the high and low standard of
ascertainability is the ability for plaintiffs to rely on a defendant's
records. While allowing the plaintiff to use a defendant's records to
ascertain class members, a defendant's lack of records or poor recording
keeping does not lessen Rule 23 requirements under the higher standard
of ascertainability. 223 Conversely, the courts adhering to the lower
standard have focused on the need to not incentivize poor recordkeeping
by corporate defendants.
Like the Seventh Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit also adopted the lower standard of ascertainability. In
Young v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,224 the court addressed
several issues of the plaintiffs ability to ascertain a class of overcharged
policyholders. 225 On appeal, the court held that the district court, in
certifying the class, correctly ruled that the plaintiffs class was
ascertainable. 226 The Sixth Circuit focused on two important issues: 1)
did a class become unascertainable when it may involve and require a
large number of individual determinations in order to ascertain group
members, and 2) to what level must a defendant's records be able to
identify class members in order for a plaintiff to rely on the defendant's
records to satisfy the ascertainability requirement. 227
Even when searching through a defendant's electronic records "may
require additional, even substantial, review of files," various rationales
support class certification. 228 First, one of the purposes of Rule 23 is to
allow many smaller claims to be tried together, and the potential of
greater liability to the defendant should not limit a class's ability to bring

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id.
Id.
As discussed in section III(B)(5) of this Comment.
693 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 535.
Id. at 540.
Id.
Id. at 539.
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Second, the litigation process, through discovery, already
provides a means for handling large amounts of document review so as
to discern who is eligible for membership. 230
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit pointed to the district court's rationale,
which stated, "[T]he need to manually review files is not dispositive. If it
were, defendants against whom claims of wrongful conduct have been
made could escape class-wide review due solely to the size of their
businesses or the manner in which their business records were
maintained." 231 The court reached the exact opposite holding from
circuits applying the higher standard by focusing on the purpose of class
action law, instead of strictly focusing on the formalities of Rule 23.232 If
class action lawsuits often arise due to "systemic failures of
administration, policy application, or records management," 233 those
same systematic failures should not be able to defeat class
certification. 234
In Young, the defendant argued that its records would produce a
variable rate between 5% and 30% in identifying potential class
members. 235 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that a defendant
should not be able to escape class action by proving the inadequacy of its
own records. 236 The court determined that sufficient evidence had been
presented before the district court that the defendant's records could be
used to identify class members and that the unknown error rate was not
sufficient to defeat the ascertainability requirement. 237
suit.229

IV. WHAT STANDARD SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT ADOPT?

A. Policy Concerns Behind Each Approach
In deciding what satisfies the ascertainability requirement, circuit
courts, regardless of which approach they chose to implement, consider
several policy concerns permeating class action lawsuits. The following
229. Id. at 540; see Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 722 (9th Cir.
2010).
230. Young, 693 F.3d at 540.
231. Id. (alteration in original).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 541; see Slapikas v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 250 F.R.D. 232, 250 (W.D. Pa.
2008) (finding class action manageable notwithstanding defendant's contention that "no
database exists easily and efficiently to make the determination that would be required for
each file.").
237. Young, 693 F.3d at 541.
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are additional important considerations: administrative convenience,
unfairness to absent class members, unfairness to bona fide class
members, and the due process interest of the defendant. 238 The two
approaches place more weight on certain concerns and less on others,
resulting in the adoption of different approaches.
1. Completing the Equation: The Cost of Administrative
Inconvenience and the Benefits of the Class Action Device
In the last year, there have been a combined 361,689 case filings in the
federal district courts. 239 Suffice it to say, judges, especially at the federal
level, are busy. Most types of cases, whether civil or otherwise, may
become unwieldy for any number of reasons, but class action lawsuits are
often naturally unwieldy due to the number of class members affected.
As a result, district courts place greater emphasis on a plaintiffs need to
produce an administratively convenient way to identify class members.
Otherwise, the efficiencies expected of class action lawsuits disappear
and the court becomes overburdened. 240 Courts should not be quick to
deny certification by using "administrative convenience" as any easy way
out when determining ascertainability. Instead, when faced with
concerns of administrative convenience, courts should utilize the
superiority requirement of Rule 23.
The superiority requirement of Rule 23 requires that the class device
be "superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy." 241 If courts are quick to dispose of class
actions due to administrative convenience issues, then the superiority
requirement becomes superfluous. 242 The court will see potential
problems with the class and elect to not certify the class. In doing this,
courts focus only on the administrative problems the court would face if
certification were granted. 243 Instead, by viewing administrative
problems under the superiority requirement, courts are forced to look at

238. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663-69.
239. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2015, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2015
(last
visited Oct. 14, 2016).
240. Class actions allow many plaintiffs to sue one defendant collectively. However, if
the court wll not be able to identify class members without "extensive and individualized
fact- finding or mini-trials," then the class action process serves no value. Marcus, 687 F.3d
at 593.
241. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
242. See Daniel Luks, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit:Name That Class Member,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2395 (2014).
243. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663.
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both the costs and benefits of allowing certification of the proposed
class. 244 Courts must understand that certification of a class may produce
administrative inconveniences and corresponding efficiencies at the
same time. 245

Often, the cases that will be the hardest to certify under the
ascertainability requirement have no other realistic alternative in which
the case can be litigated. 246 A district court's focus on the superiority
requirement should not automatically result in certification of classes
when administrative problems look certain, but the court should
complete a thorough analysis of what other alternative methods of case
management exist. 247 Additionally, when faced with potential
administrative convenience issues, a court may decertify later if and
when those issues become a true problem. District court judges have
great discretion on how to manage a class action. 248 When courts only
consider the administrative costs a class may produce, and fail to address
whether alternative forms of litigation exist, the courts will
systematically deny certification of worthy classes.
2. Unfairness to Absent Class Members: Actual Notice or Best
Notice
A second reason courts have adopted the higher standard of
ascertainability is the need to protect absent class members. 249 Without
250
proper notice, a member loses his or her ability to opt out of the class.

244. Id.
245. See WRIGHT ET AL., 7AA FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1780 (3d ed. 2016).
246. See id.
247. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 664.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 665.
250. Members who "opt out" from the class are not bound by future settlements or
judgments for or against the class. When faced with the opportunity to join a class, potential
members have several options: "(1) Do nothing. You will remain a member of the class and
be bound by the result, win or lose. (2) Opt out of the class early before any class certification
decision or settlement is made. You will not be bound by the result and will preserve your
ability to pursue an individual action immediately or at some later time (provided, in the
absence of any tolling agreement with the defendants, you file within the applicable
limitations period). (3) Remain in the class-and defer the opt-out decision-until such time
as the class is certified by the court either to proceed to litigating the merits of the claims
or for settlement purposes, whichever comes first. If a class is certified to proceed or for
settlement purposes, you will typically receive a notice explaining the deadline and
procedure you must follow to opt out. For class actions certified for settlement purposes for
less than all defendants, there may be multiple opportunities to opt out, and companies
may decide to remain in settlement classes with some defendants and opt out as to the
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By requiring a higher standard of ascertainability, fewer potential class
members will receive improper notice; yet, this will not necessarily
produce a better result.
First, this argument centers on the proposition that "class members
must receive actual notice of the class action so that they do not lose their
opt-out rights." 251 However, the text of Rule 23 provides that "[fjor any
class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members
the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort." 252 The rule does not require actual notice to all

members, but acknowledges that, in some circumstances, actual notice
may not even be possible. 253
When class members' names and addresses are known or reasonably
obtainable, members can be notified of the class through first-class
mail. 254 Even

when the identity

of class

members

proves more

challenging, as long as the alternative methods satisfy Rule 23(b)(3), due
process is not violated. 255 Other means used to notify absent class
members include notice through third parties, paid advertising, and
posting class information in areas frequented by class members. 256
While Rule 23(b)(3) allows for a wide range of types of class action
litigation, low-value consumer claims provide few, if any, incentives for
opting out of class membership. 257 Several courts have adopted the
approach of approving notice plans that are "commensurate with the
stakes," 258 meaning when the claim sought is low-value, class

remainder." Charles H. Samel, Whether to Opt Out of Antitrust Class Actions: A Four-Step
Checklist, AM. BAR Ass'N (May 26, 2010), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/com
mittees/corporate/articles/spring20l5-0515-whether-opt-out-antitrust-class-actions-four-st
ep-checklist.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
251. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665.
252. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
253. See Geoffrey C. Shaw, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2367-69 (2015);
see Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting due
process requirement of providing individual notice); Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294,
1321 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that "even in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, due process does not
require that class members actually receive notice").
254. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665.
255. Id.
256. Id.; see Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2013).
257. Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that
"only a lunatic or a fanatic" would litigate the claim individually.).
258. Hughes, 731 F.3d at 676-77. In Hughes, each plaintiffs claim was valued at
approximately $1,000 or less. Because the claims were so low, the court approved a notice
plan consisting of sticker notices on the defendant's two ATMs, publication of a notice in
the primary local newspaper, and notice on a website. Id.
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approach, while protecting absent class members, would lead to the
inability of individuals with valid claims to recover anything at all.
3. Unfairness to Bona Fide Class Members
A third fear held by courts following the higher standard of
ascertainability is that award shares of bona fide class members will be
diluted, especially when class members may identify themselves through
self-serving affidavits. 260 Courts apply the rationale that using selfidentification through affidavits increases the chances of erroneous or
fraudulent claims, which in turn lead to a dilution of each class member's
award share. 261 While it is understandable to fear that people will jump
on the opportunity to receive "free money," other important concerns are
neglected if the analysis ends there. First, the risk of dilution due to
fraudulent or erroneous claims is low. Second, without certification, bona
fide members cannot recover anything at all.
In consumer cases, the potential reward tends to be small. Some courts
have pointed to this fact to question whether people, after balancing the
risks and the rewards, "would be willing to sign affidavits under penalty
of perjury saying that they purchased the good or service." 262 Even if bona
fide class members' claims are diluted, research shows that average class
participation rates are very low, meaning that even large percentages of
fraudulent claims will fail to dilute a reward. 263 Additionally, courts are
not without methods for fighting the admission of fraudulent claims. 264

259. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 666.
260. Id.
261. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310 ("It is unfair to absent class members if there is a
significant likelihood their recovery will be diluted by fraudulent or inaccurate claims.').
262. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 677. See Byrd, 784 F.3d at 175 (Rendell, J., concurring). In
Mullins, the value of each claim was approximately $70 (the retail price). Mullins, 795 F.3d
at 667.

263. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems
and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 119-20 (2007) (noting that it is not
unusual to have participation rates of ten to fifteen percent and examining more recent
examples of rates lower than five percent). See Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed:
Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L.
REV. 305, 315 (2010) ("[It is simply not true that compensation of uninjured parties affects
the compensation interests of injured class members").
264. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667. Courts can utilize the help of "claim administrators,
various auditing processes, sampling for fraud detection, follow-up notices to explain the
claims process, and other techniques tailored by the parties and the court to take into
account the size of the claims, the cost of the techniques, and an empirical assessment of
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If faced with potential claim dilution issues, a district judge can always,
in his or her own discretion, allow the litigation process to continue and
to address problems as they arise.
If courts follow the policy of finding a class unascertainable when a
significant risk of dilution from fraudulent claims exists, then bona fide
class members often will be left with no reward. This all or nothing
approach does little for bona fide class members. Several courts have
pointed out how focusing on the policy of protecting against dilution
adversely affects other policy concerns. Specifically, courts note that the
policy of deterring and punishing corporate wrongdoing takes a backseat,
as class certification becomes more challenging. 265
This issue arises in the area of record keeping, and how a defendant's
lack of adequate record keeping should affect a plaintiffs ability to
ascertain class members, and whether a plaintiff must still satisfy the
lofty Rule 23 requirements. 266 By focusing on the plaintiffs inability to
satisfy ascertainability requirements instead of defendant wrongdoing,
courts incentivize and promote conduct by defendants that hurt
customers.
Likewise, while emphasizing a plaintiffs burden of satisfying the Rule
23 requirements, courts applying the heightened standard of
ascertainability devalue many of the methods available to plaintiffs to
prove class membership. 267 Most importantly, many courts emphatically

the likelihood of fraud or inaccuracy." Id. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §§ 21.66.661 (Judge Stanley Marcus et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004); ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12:20 (4th ed. 2002).
265. Byrd, 784 F.3d at 175-76 (Rendell, J., concurring), discussing Hughes, 731 F.3d at
677 ("A class action, like litigation in general, has a deterrent as well as a compensatory
objective.').
266. See Daniels v. Hollister Co., 113 A.3d 796, 801 (N.J. App. 2015)
("Ascertainability ... is particularly misguided when applied to a case where any difficulties
encountered in identifying class members are a consequence of a defendant's own acts or
omissions. . .. Allowing a defendant to escape responsibility for its alleged wrongdoing by
dint of its particular recordkeeping policies . . . is not in harmony with the principles
governing class actions."); Birchmeier v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 240, 250
(N.D. Ill. 2014). ("Doing this-or declining to certify a class altogether, as defendants
propose-would create an incentive for a person to violate the TCPA on a mass scale and
keep no records of its activity, knowing that it could avoid legal responsibility for the full
scope of its illegal conduct."); Lilly v. Jamba Juice Co., 308 F.R.D. 231, 238 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
("Adopting the Carrera approach would have significant negative ramifications for the
ability to obtain redress for consumer injuries.").
267. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 668-69. "See, e.g., Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d
349, 356 (3d Cir. 2013) ('Rule 23's requirements that the class be administratively feasible
to ascertain and sufficiently numerous to warrant class action treatment cannot be relaxed
or adjusted on the basis of Hayes' assertion that Wal-Mart's records are of no help to him.)."
Id.
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reject class member's use of self-serving affidavits to prove
membership. 268 While this would not create an issue in all types of class
action matters, low-value consumer class action cases are unique in that
consumers rarely keep packaging, receipts, or other means of proving
class membership. For example, a nutritional supplement that costs $15
may be purchased at a grocery store, along with regular good items, and
quickly discarded. If defendants fail to keep adequate records, affidavits
from class members quickly become the only viable option for potential
class members. Furthermore, affidavits are readily accepted in other
areas of the law, such as in support of a defendant's motion for summary
judgment. 269 The only valid objection to prohibiting the use of affidavits
to prove class membership is to prevent the submission of fraudulent
applications for class membership. However, as stated before, district
court judges have discretion as to how to properly manage a case and to
test and weed out improper submissions and requests for class
membership.
4. Due Process Interest of Defendant
Like the prior policy concerns, the courts that follow the higher
standard of ascertainability focus on an important consideration, the due
process interest of the defendant; however, these courts reach an
improper conclusion. 270 While defendants have a due process interest in
not overpaying damages and being able to challenge a plaintiffs
evidence, 271 these interests do not preclude a plaintiff from presenting
evidence of membership based on an affidavit. A defendant may
challenge the evidence presented by class members at any point during
the litigation proceedings, yet the constitutional rights do not extend so
far as to limit a plaintiffs valid use of self-identifying evidence. A district
court can, through its case management procedure, impose "audits and
verification procedures and challenges" to safeguard defendants from
improper class applications and submissions. 272 Additionally, a
defendant's due process rights do not depend on whether a class is wholly
ascertainable at the certification stage, but instead on whether the
268. Carrera,727 F.3d at 308.
269. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 669.
270. See Carrera,727 F.3d at 307 ("Ascertainability provides due process by requiring
that a defendant be able to test the reliability of the evidence submitted to prove class
membership."); Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594 ("Forcing BMW and Bridgestone to accept as true
absent persons' declarations that they are members of the class, without further indicia of
reliability, would have serious due process implications.").
271. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 365.
272. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 669.
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defendant has sufficient ability to raise defenses and challenge
273
individual class members' standing or claim validity.
B. Priming the Court for a Solution: When Will the Supreme Court Have
Another Opportunity to Rule on the Issue of Ascertainabilityof
Class Members?
While the Supreme Court recently declined certiorari in Mullins to
address what standard of ascertainability should be used to identify class
members, the Court will likely get another opportunity to address the
issue, and soon. If and when the Court decides to grant certiorari depends
on many factors. First, the Court traditionally has allowed the Circuit
courts to develop their own laws and rationale as a means of "trying out"
and developing the law. Until big enough divides exist between the
Circuits, the Court usually refrains from addressing the issue. Second,
the Court will likely decline certiorari to cases it believes will be decided
narrowly. Unsurprisingly, the Court has denied certiorari to several
274
As a result, litigation on the
other cases presenting the same issue.
issue of ascertainability continues to bubble up through the district and
circuit courts.
During the writing of this Comment, Briseiio v. ConagraFoods, Inc.,275
276
to
a Ninth Circuit case, progressed from briefing, to oral arguments,
an opinion on January 3, 2017. In Conagra, the plaintiffs seek damages
for misleading statements by Conagra in labeling of various cooking oils,
whose labels claim they are "100% natural," when they are allegedly
277
derived from genetically modified organisms. The case was brought for
review before the Ninth Circuit, pursuant to Rule 23(f), after the district
273. See Lilly, 308 F.R.D. at 239 ("Defendants would certainly be entitled to object to a
process through which a non-judicial administrator 'ascertains' each applicant's class
membership on the basis of the applicants' own self-identification, gives a defendant no
opportunity to challenge that determination, and then racks up the defendant's bill every
time an individual submits a form."); Johnson v. General Mills, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 519, 524
(C.D. Cal. 2011) ("If Mr. Johnson establishes liability for the class, Defendants may
challenge reliance and causation individually during a determination of damages, after the
issues that are common have been litigated and resolved.").
274. Like Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, the Supreme Court also denied certiorari in
Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2015) in early 2016. Both petitions
to the Supreme Court arose from federal circuits that have adopted the lower standard of
ascertainability.
275. 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017).
276. Oral Argument for Robert Briseiho v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 15-55727, UNITED
STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/medialview
video.php?pkvid=0000010172 (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
277. Reply Brief for Appellant at 1, Briseflo v. Conagra Foods, Inc. (No. 15-55727), 2016
WL 859642 (9th Cir. 2016).
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court certified plaintiffs' class. 278 On appeal, Conagra raises several
issues, including a request for the Ninth Circuit to adopt the higher
standard of ascertainability, 279 often times citing to Third Circuit
authority discussed in Part III of this Comment. Like those cases,
Conagra's appeal for the heightened test of ascertainability is flawed.
First, while Conagra asserts that the plaintiff failed to offer an
administratively feasible plan to ascertain class membership, the
plaintiff may rely on an objectively defined class definition. At oral
argument, counsel for Conagra argued that affirming the district court's
ruling would drastically lower the bar for requirements to class
membership and certification. However, the panel countered that
applying the law, as proffered by Conagra, would actually drastically
raise the bar. 280 In the Ninth Circuit, no binding precedent exists to
require the court to apply the higher standard of ascertainability. When
asked at oral argument what Ninth Circuit authority demonstrates a
higher standard for the court, Conagra cited to two cases: Martin v.
Pacific Parking Systems Inc. 281 and Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc.282
The Martin case is an unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion, and has no
binding effect on the court. 283 Next, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial

of certification in Berger because the class was not ascertainable.

However, the court did not deny certification because the plaintiff class
did not offer an administratively feasible plan but because the class was
based on a class definition that was neither objective nor definite. 284 As

278. Id.
279. The Ninth Circuit has previously adopted the higher standard of ascertainability
in the unpublished opinion of Martin v. PacificParkingSys. Inc., 583 F. App'x 803 (9th Cir.
2014). Id. at 3. Here, the defendant claims identifying class members will not be
administratively feasible because "consumers do not generally save grocery receipts and
are unlikely to remember details about individual purchases of a low-cost product like
cooking oil." Briseio, 844 F.3d at 1125.
280. Oral Argument at 17:50, Brisefio v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. (No. 15-55727), 2016 WL
859642 (9th Cir. 2016), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view-video.php?pkvid
=0000010172.
281. 583 F. App'x 803 (9th Cir. 2014).
282. 741 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014).
283. At oral arguments, Judge Fletcher states, 'Tm not going to pay attention any
attention to [the Martin case]." Oral Argument at 27:15, Briseflo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.
(No. 15-55727), 2016 WL 859642 (9th Cir. 2016), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media
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articulated by the court, the "weaker" standard of ascertainability is not
really a lower standard but a plain reading of Rule 23, which already
provides safeguards for defendants. 285 Additionally, only applying the
requirements of Rule 23 does not preclude the requirement that class
members be identifiable.
The Ninth Circuit's affirmation of the district court shows that it
agrees that the ascertainability requirement, as seen by the high
standard approach, is not a textual requirement of Rule 23, nor is it
implied by the language of Rule 23.286 Instead, a plaintiff class must only
be clearly defined. 287 Now that the Ninth Circuit has ruled in Brisefto,
the defendant is all but guaranteed to petition the Supreme Court for
certiorari, once again bringing the issue of ascertainability of class
actions to the Court for clarification.
V. CONCLUSION
Since 2010, the ability to bring consumer class action lawsuits has
become more challenging, as a conservative-leaning, five-person majority
has allowed new restrictions on classes seeking certification. The death
of Justice Scalia opened the doors to a potential democratic appointment,
under President Obama, and would likely have halted the development
288
However, resitance from a
of new restrictions on class certification.
republican-majority Senate tied President Obama's hands on the matter,
increasing the signficance of the presidential election. After his victory,
newly-elected republican President Donald Trump appointed
conservative Judge Neil Gorsuch from the United States Court of
289
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to fill the empty seat on the Court. If this
290
reestablishes the conservative majority on the Court, as it likely will,

the moderate to liberal minority will have little to do but dissent to new

285. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit begins by using the "traditional tools
of statutory construction," beginning with the plain meaning of Rule 23, which does not
mention "administrative feasibility." Briseiho, 844 F.3d at 1125. Additionally, the court
views the "prerequisites" in Rule 23(a) as an exhaustive list, under the doctrine of expressio
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286. Id. at 1124.
287. Id.
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9
2
donald-trump-wins-supreme-court- 1444
289. Adriane de Vogue, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed to the Supreme Court, CNN (Apr. 7,
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obstacles to class certification that arise. While a conservative
appointment will likely result in the adoption of the high standard of
ascertainability, it will also result in the extermination of many lowdollar consumer class action lawsuits, as discussed in this Comment.
Even more worrisome, the heightened standard of ascertainability
reduces corporate accountability, lessens oversight and protection from
fraudulent practices in production and marketing, and incentivizes poor
record keeping practices by corporate defendants.
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